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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
of property which result from a bond issue by a political subdivision
require an approving vote of the freeholders.2 - However, the trend
toward liberalization was clearly expressed in a recent case in which,
in upholding a decree of validation of a municipal bond issue without
a vote of the freeholders, the Court stated that, if the bonds are to
be paid for exclusively from the facility, it is not material whether
they are to finance a new facility or an addition to a facility already
owned and operated.
2 5
The holding in the present case, while illustrating a departure from
the early construction of Article IX, Section 6, pursues the recent liberal
trend dispensing with a vote when the bonds are to be serviced from an
independent though contingent fund and contemplate no direct taxation
on the freeholders, who have already enjoyed their opportunity of exer-
cising their franchise as citizens in the election of their representatives.
2 6
WiLLiAm S. BELcHER
HABEAS CORPUS: ABUSIVE USE BY SUCCESSIVE
APPLICATIONS
Price v. Johnston, 68 Sup. Ct. 1049 (1948)
The petitioner, convicted of bank robbery by a federal district court,
made four separate applications, over a period of eight years, for
writs of habeas corpus, all of which were denied. The layman petitioner's
papers were prepared pro se. A motion to overrule the respondent's
return to the first application and a subsequent appeal included refer-
ences to but did not raise the important issue of whether the Government
had knowingly used false testimony. This issue was finally raised in
the fourth petition, which was dismissed upon the ground of an abusive
use of the writ without a hearing upon the merits; the dismissal was
affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. Upon certiorari, HELD, the
Government was under a duty to allege with clarity and particularity
"'Board of Comm'rs v. Herrick, 123 Fla. 619, 167 So. 386 (1936); Leon County
v. State, 122 Fla. 505, 165 So. 666 (1936).
"Zinnen v. Fort Lauderdale, 32 So.2d 162, 163 (Fla. 1947).
"Accord Bollin v. Graydon, 177 S. C. 374, 181 S. E. 467 (1935).
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the exact nature of the abuse rather than to aver generally; hence dis-
missal by the district court was improper. Reversed and remanded,
Chief Justice Vinson, Justices Frankfurter, Reed, and Jackson dissenting.
A series of decisions reflects the law on the question of whether
successive applications based on previously existent grounds, presented
or not, constitute an abusive use of the writ of habeas corpus.
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is guaranteed by the
Constitution.1 It is one of high prerogative2 but not one of course,3
issuance usually being in the discretion of the court. 4 A presumption
of regularity in the conviction s places the burden of proof upon the
petitioner, 6 and it is necessary that a prima facie case be made out or the
petition will not be entertained. 7 The writ is an extraordinary remedys
and should not be examined with technical nicety.9 Judges are under a
duty to resolve the true meanings of applications despite ineptitudes of
language;' 0 however, as in the present case, averments will not be taken
as importing a meaning other than that expressed." Even the im-
probability that the facts are as alleged will furnish no basis for a refusal
to hear such evidence as the petitioner may produce at the hearing.'
2
It is a well-accepted rule of our federal courts,' 3 as it was at common
IU. S. CoNsT. Art. 1, §9; Ex parte Johnson, 1 Okla. Cr. R. 414, 98 Pac. 461
(1908).
'Click v. Click, 98 W. Va. 419, 127 S. E. 194 (1925).
3Ex parte Lynch, 18 F. Supp. 673 (D. C. N. D. Ind. 1937).
'Goto v. Lane, 265 U. S. 393 (1924); Storti v. Massachusetts, 183 U. S. 138
(1901); Biddle v. Hayes, 8 F.2d 937 (C. C. A. 8th 1925).
'White v. Pescor, 155 F.2d 902 (C. C. A. 8th 1946); Hampson v. Smith, 153
F.2d 417 (C. C. A. 9th 1946).
'White v. Pescor, 155 F.2d 902 (C. C. A. 8th 1946).
'United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161 (1904).
'Sisquoc Ranch Co. v. Roth, 153 F.2d 437 (C. C. A. 9th 1946).
'Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 (1942); Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U. S. 342
(1941); Crooms v. Schad, 51 Fla. 168, 40 So. 497 (1906).
"0Lynch v. Johnston, 160 F.2d 950 (C. C. A. 9th, 1947).
11Ex parte Zimmerman, 132 F.2d (C. C. A. 9th 1942).
"Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275 (1941); McCrea v. Jackson, 148 F.2d 193
(C. C. A. 6th 1945).
1'Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U. S. 224 (1924); United States v. Reimer, 103 F.2d
341 (C. C. A. 2nd 1939); Coates v. Lawrence, 46 F. Supp. 414 (D. C. S. D. Ga.
1942).
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law,' 4 that the strict doctrine of res judicata does not apply to petitions
for writs of habeas corpus. A prior refusal to discharge the prisoner,
however, is given weight,15 especially when the later application is made
upon the same or similar grounds., But, since the district court had
at no time allowed a hearing upon the merits of the petitioner's con-
tention, that view cannot be applied here.
In the comparatively recent past some courts, both state17 and
federal,' 8 have held that denial of prior applications is res judicata as
to previously known issues and facts that could have been raised in the
first application. These courts reason that good faith precludes reserva-
tion of known grounds for later use. The holding in the principal case
takes cognizance of this recent trend, yet modifies it so as to place upon
the prosecution the burden of alleging the particular abuse. Only then
would it become the duty of the petitioner to show reasons justifying the
court in overlooking the delay in bringing forth such grounds. The
decision correctly recognizes the need for control of the abusive use
made of the writ by federal prisoners,'9 while at the same time it
detracts nothing from the necessary liberality of the writ.
JOHN M. FARRELL
"'Ex parte Kaine, 14 Fed. Cas. 78 (1853); Maria v. Kirby, 51 Ky. 542 (1852);
In re Snell, 31 Minn. 110, 16 N. W. 692 (1883) ; Ex parte Partington, 153 Eng. Rep.
284 (1845).
"5 Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U. S. 239 (1924); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.
S. 224 (1924); DeMaurez v. Swope, 110 F.2d 564 (C. C. A. 9th 1940).
"8 Moses v. United States, 152 F.2d 454 (C. C. A. 6th 1945); Dorsey v. Gill,
148 F.2d 857 (C. C. A. D. C. 1945); Padgett v. McCauley, 95 F.2d 839 (C. C.
A. 9th 1938).
"7 Garrison v. Johnston, 151 F.2d 1011 (C. C. A. 9th 1945); Swihart v. Johnston,
150 F.2d 721 (C. C. A. 9th 1945); Wong Sun v. United States, 293 Fed. 273 (C.
C. A. 6th 1923).
18 .Rx parte Upson, 7 Cal. App. 531, 94 Pac. 855 (1908); Johnson v. Lindsey, 89
Fla. 143, 103 So. 419 (1925); Mercein v. People, 35 Am. Dec. 653 (N. Y. 1840);
In re Seale, 76 Okla. Cr. R. 164, 135 P.2d 346 (1943); McMahon v. Mead, 30
S. D. 515, 139 N. W. 122 (1912); Pittman v. Byars, 112 S. W. 102 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1908); Ex parte Heller, 146 Wis. 517, 131 N. W. 991 (1911).
"0 Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F. R. D. 313
(1947).
3
Farrell: Habeas Corpus: Abusive Use by Successive Applications
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1949
